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Abstract: 
Risk scholars within Security studies have argued that the concept of 
security has gone through a fundamental transformation away from a 
threat-based conceptualisation of defence, urgency and exceptionality to 
one of preparedness, precautions and prevention of future risks, some of 
which are calculable, others of which are not. This article explores whether 
and how the concept of security is changing due to this ‘rise of risk’, 
through a hermeneutically grounded conceptual and discourse analysis of 
the United Kingdom government’s national security strategy (NSS) from 
1998 to 2011. We ask how risk-security language is employed in the NSS; 




consequences of these shifts can be discerned in UK national security 
practices. Our aim is twofold: to better understand shifts in the security 
understandings and policies of UK authorities; and to contribute to the 
conceptual debate on the significance of the rise of risk as a component of 






































































National security risks? Uncertainty, austerity and other logics of  
risk in the UK government's national security strategy 
 
Of course, in an age of uncertainty the unexpected will happen, and we must be prepared to 
react to that by making our institutions and infrastructure as resilient as we possibly can.1 
 
This quote from the introduction to the UK government’s 2010 National Security Strategy 
(NSS) document presented to Parliament, seems to confirm a recent contention by many 
security analysts: For policy makers, security has become less about the defence against known 
and specific threats. It is instead about precautions against and – when possible – prevention of 
future risks, some of which are calculable, others of which are not. Risk scholars within Security 
Studies have suggested that ‘[r]isk and uncertainty are the hallmarks of world politics at the dawn 
of the twenty-first century’ (Williams, 2008: 58). Security practice no longer takes place within 
the Cold War paradigm of deterrence and defence, but follows the precautionary principle, 
where it is worth acting today because the possibility of catastrophe in the future is so calamitous 
that we cannot risk inaction.  
 
Individual quotes, such as the one above, may be striking, but are not necessarily symptomatic of 
deeper shifts in conceptualisations of security. In this article we investigate the extent to which 
the national security thinking behind the formulation of the United Kingdom’s national security 
strategy (NSS) from 1998 to 2011 has taken on a language and logic of ‘security risks’. We ask 
how risk-security language has been employed in the NSS; what the factors are that motivate 
such discursive shifts; and what, if any, consequences of these shifts can be discerned in UK 
national security practices. Our aim is twofold: to better understand shifts in the security 
understandings and policies of UK authorities; and to contribute to the conceptual debate on the 


































































significance of the rise of risk as a component of the concept of security. While anchoring our 
investigation in discourse and conceptual analysis, we relate these findings hermeneutically to 
(perceived) changes in the security environment and in security policies and practices.  
 
We begin the article by discussing this methodological approach. Based on the work of Petersen 
(2013), we then identify three ‘schools’ of risk-security analysis in IR: ‘Risk as governmentality’ 
and ‘global risk management’ are both drawn from sociology; while the third school, ‘political 
risk analysis’, is adapted from economics and business studies. The main body of the article is 
our discourse analysis of the UK’s national security strategy (NSS). The concluding section then 
reviews our findings in terms of the conceptual, practical and normative tenets of the three risk-
security schools. We suggest that the relative rise of risk in the NSS is significant, but does not – 
yet – amount to a dramatic reconceptualisation of the concept of security among UK security 
policy makers.  
A discursive and conceptual approach 
We have chosen to centre our analysis on the discursive and conceptual level, rather than on 
security practices or context. While both the latter are highly significant, we do this for three 
reasons: First, it is useful to conduct systematic, in-depth empirical research on the nature and 
trajectory of ‘the rise of risk’ in the conceptualisations of security held by state security elites. 
Findings from such empirical research feed into theoretical debates on how political concepts 
such as ‘security’ can and do change. The meaning of the concept of security is not objectively 
defined but reflexive and constructed, and the answer to the question ‘what is security’ is worked 
out through political debate and embedded in historical and social traditions (Freeden, 1996: 52-
53). An important part of security research – and indeed security theorising – must therefore be 
to study what, actually, security practitioners make of security in particular contexts. Following 


































































Ciuta (2009: 325-325), this article is an effort at ‘taking seriously the definitions and practices of 
actors’.  
 
Second, and deeply connected to the first point, we wanted to do more than provide a snapshot 
of the official security discourse of the UK government. We study the core NSS documents 
from 1998 to 2011, to see not only how the concept of risk has been introduced, but also how 
its usage has changed and become more prominent over time. This enables us to reflect on how 
the concept of security is changing, and hence contribute to the long-standing Security Studies 
debate on the nature and durability of the concept of security.  
 
Petersen (2012: 708) argues that neither ‘risk nor security alone can be considered an analytical 
or theoretical concept’. This may be true about ‘risk’, but ‘security’ has a long history as a core 
political concept in philosophical and public debates on how to organise political communities. 
The question is not whether ‘risk’ is replacing ‘security’, but whether ‘risk’ is becoming an 
increasingly central and accepted component of contemporary conceptualisations of security. As 
is the case with all political concepts, the meaning of ‘security’ is never fixed and immutable. 
Political concepts are ‘constructs that reflect social and historical usage’ (Freeden, 1996: 52). This 
means the contents of the concept of security can change over time and across audiences, but 
not arbitrarily. When interpretations of the meaning of security change, they do so within the 
confines of what is intelligible and acceptable within the social, cultural and historical parameters 
of a particular time and place. Otherwise, the new interpretation is unlikely to take hold beyond 
academic debates (Hammerstad, 2014: 22). 
 
The debate on risk in the International Relations literature has, in the view of Petersen (2012), 
been limited in comparison to that taking place in the field of sociology. She argues that ‘risk 
studies within security studies cling to the very generalized descriptions of current social 


































































developments and trends; description such as “risk society”, “culture of fear” or “risk/security 
dispositifs” which tends to conceal a possibly much greater variety of conceptual understandings 
in the daily practices of security agents’ (Petersen, 2012: 696). The discourse analysis in this 
article provides an opportunity to move beyond generalisations about security in an ‘era of 
uncertainty’, and discover the nuanced and differing ways in which ‘risk’ is employed in the UK 
government’s NSS. Some usages are mundane; others are transformative. The language of risk 
serves rhetorical purposes, but also reveals shifts in security elites’ perception of the nature of 
the UK’s external security environment.   
 
This leads us to our third reason for focusing on discourse: discursive shifts are significant. By 
mapping discursive changes, we discern changes in the mental landscapes of security analysts 
and practitioners; changes in perceptions of what is deemed natural, convincing, possible, 
proper, necessary and desirable. How we think about security affect how we formulate security 
strategies, enact security policies, and even chose rhetorical tools. Security practices and changes 
in the material environment in turn affect discursive changes, in an hermeneutical circle between 
horizon, perception and practice. While our analysis centres on the discursive level, we relate our 
findings to changes in security practices and the external environment, in order to better 
understand not just how, but why, conceptualisations of security change, and what impact such 
changes have.     
 
Three risk schools 
Before embarking on an analysis of the UK government’s national security strategy discourse, 
we briefly recount the academic discussion on the meaning and significance of the rise of risk. A 
risk approach has developed partially as a challenge to what has become the most dominant 
constructivist security approach, the Copenhagen School. In brief, the Copenhagen School 


































































based its original formulation of securitisation theory on a traditional conception of security 
revolving around notions of existential threat, survival, confrontation and competition. It 
maintains that a securitised issue acquires the logic of security; it becomes subsumed within a 
politics of survival and urgency that justifies exceptional measures to counteract the perceived 
threat (Buzan et al, 1998).  
 
Risk scholars dispute the zero-sum, existential logic of the Copenhagen School’s 
conceptualisation of security: ‘risk-security writers are not suggesting an adjustment to the 
conventional notion of security but a radical reconfiguration of the concept itself’ (Corry, 2010: 
10). They propose ‘risk’ as ‘the master concept’ of security (Corry, 2012: 243), in contrast to 
‘threat’ as representing the Copenhagen School. For most risk scholars, the rise of risk requires a 
new security logic. Unlike threats, which are discrete and tangible, risks are everywhere, but only 
as possibilities. ‘Global risks make us insecure because they have become endless, too large and 
too apocalyptic to be contained within regimes or new world orders’ (Coker, 2002: 59). A risk 
perspective on security differs from the Copenhagen School in that it is concerned with systemic 
characteristics rather than the intentions and actions of (enemy) actors (Aradau et al, 2008: 148). 
Risk language tends to ‘depersonalise danger’: One can trace no clear enemy as so many aspects 
of society may be defined in terms of risk (Aradau et al, 2008: 151; Corry, 2012: 244; Salter, 
2008; Van Munster, 2005: 6-7). The language of risk does not posit direct causal patterns 
between threats and referent objects, but highlights, in Kantian terminology, ‘the conditions of 
possibility’ wherein a risk could transform into actual harm.  
 
But it is not enough to contrast risk scholars to the Copenhagen School. There are (at least) 
three different ‘risk schools’ within Security Studies (Petersen, 2012: 701-708), with different 
methodologies and normative agendas. First, the ‘risk as governmentality’ school is concerned 
with transforming the concept of security from war and violence to governance and technology, 


































































taking their cue from sociological governmentality approaches and the works of Foucault.2 A 
second school, ‘global risk management’, also views the concept of risk as transformatory. This 
group is inspired by Beck’s and Giddens’ macro-sociological and historical analyses of societal 
transformation ‘from security and nation state to risk and globalization’ (Petersen, 2012: 703). 
Unlike threats, risks are unforeseen and unpredictable (at least in their particular instances), and 
living with risk is a permanent feature of society (Beck, 1992, 1999). Hence, ‘identifying an 
existential threat would no longer be a necessary part of securitisation if potential risks rather 
than actual threats dominate the political security imagination’ (Corry, 2012: 243, emphasis in 
original; Elbe, 2008: 179). When risks are viewed as ‘too large and too apocalyptic’, the 
precautionary principle sets in: Taking action now to avoid a possible future catastrophe. 
Williams (2008: 74) argues that ‘[i]ncreasingly, precautionary action will be a driver of security 
policy with profound implications for international relations’.  
 
The third school, ‘political risk analysis’, is less ambitious in theoretical reach, but purports to be 
scientific, in the positivist sense, in its methodology. It does not try to understand the conditions 
of late modernity or the neoliberal power structures underpinning governmentality, but is a 
‘problem-solving’ method for assessing ‘political risks’ such as war, political violence, terrorism, 
or expropriation of private property (Petersen, 2012: 705). Inspired by business studies and 
economic theory, political risk analysts are concerned with the actuarial logic of risk-security, a 
logic more commonly associated with the insurance industry than security practitioners. Setting 
the security agenda becomes synonymous with assessing risks through the identification of risk 
groups and risk factors, using statistics, scenario-building and other tools to measure risk 
probability and severity.  
 
The three risk schools differ in their view on how risk-security logic manifest in security practice. 
The global risk management school, inspired by Beck’s Risk Society (Beck, 1992, 1999) tends 


































































towards an optimistic view of security policy. They see possibilities for collaborative security 
practices, wherein states and societies work constructively together today to prevent possible 
disastrous events in the future. Prevention, in the form of dialogue, collaboration, adaptation, 
resilience, legitimacy, and enhancement of governance capacity, can transform security politics 
away from confrontation and conflict (Corry, 2012; Trombetta, 2008). Steinbrunner (quoted in 
Coker, 2002: 54) argues that ‘one of the most fundamental implications of globalisation is the 
shift in the balance of reliance in security policy from deterrence to reassurance and from active 
confrontation to cooperative agreement’.  
 
But prevention can also assume a confrontational hue, including pre-emptive strikes (Aradau 
and Van Munster, 2007; Coker, 2002; Heng, 2006; Van Munster, 2005; Williams, 2008). This is 
sometimes pointed out by global risk management scholars, but is more often the topic of the 
governmentality school. Inspired by Foucault’s writings on biopolitics, power and control, they 
emphasise the pernicious quality of security politics even within a risk-security logic. They 
understand risk-security practices as every-day bureaucratic routines of monitoring and control. 
When security is about risk management, it becomes a matter of long-term governance and 
routine procedures aimed at controlling uncertainty (Corry, 2012: 245, 247; Salter, 2008; Van 
Munster, 2005). ‘[R]isk is a social technology by means of which the uncertain future, be it of a 
catastrophic nature, is rendered knowable and actionable’ (Aradau et al, 2008: 150). Actions are 
taken to mitigate uncertainty and control risk - or at least to be seen to control risk by ‘doing 
something’. Such actions could include building climate change scenarios; surveillance practices 
and border security measures to control undocumented immigration; or ‘risk profiling’ of, and 
targeted measures towards, ‘risk groups’ considered particularly likely to commit terrorist acts or 
spread communicable diseases (Aradau and Van Munster, 2007: 100; Elbe, 2008: 180). 
 


































































The political risk school has a more managerial outlook than the other two. It aims to develop 
methods with which to measure the likelihood and impact of a particular risk occurring. Such 
risk analysis has long been conducted on behalf of companies seeking to invest in the developing 
world. More recently, it has been taken on by state security policy makers, for example in the 
UK’s pioneering National Risk Assessment (NRA), launched in 2008. This classified document, 
together with its publicly available sister publication, the National Risk Register (Cabinet Office, 
2012), covers risks and mitigation strategies for ‘natural events, major accidents and malicious 
attacks’ on the country’s territory, people and infrastructure.  
 
Risk assessment exercises such as the NRA, conducted in the spirit of the political risk analysis 
school, are pursued by authorities as a tool with which to prepare themselves and their societies 
for the future. They can reduce the risk of calamities through prevention, or if that cannot be 
done (e.g. in the case of natural disasters), then at least reduce the destructive impact of such 
calamities, through resilience building and disaster management planning. As can be gleaned 
from the earlier discusssion of the governmentality approach, Foucauldian risk scholars view 
such ‘problem-solving’ risk analysis exercises in a less positive light. They argue that the 
governmentality of creating societies resilient to risks is yet another, stealthy and expansive, way 
in which governments work to control populations. The logic of precautionary risk works so 
that concern over countless but unknowable catastrophic risks leads to ‘[p]rofiling and 
surveillance encompass[ing] the whole population’ and ‘everybody [becomes] regimented into 
technologies of vigilance and prudentialism’ (Aradau and Van Munster, 2007: 107).  
  
Joseph (2011) sees the rise of ‘resilience’ – a corollary of risk – as yet another cog in neoliberal 
governmentality, where security is individualised and privatised. In the UK, commuters are 
urged to look out for suspicious individuals and packets on public transport, while landlords and 
employers are asked to report suspected undocumented immigrants to the authorities. 


































































Everybody is tasked with building ‘resilience’ in the face of ever-longer lists of risks. The 
provision of security is no longer the prerogative of national security elites, but can be 
outsourced to companies, local government and individual citizens.  
 
As we turn to a discourse analysis of the UK government’s national security strategy (NSS), we 
will examine how the usages of risk-language correspond to the normative and methodological 
assumptions of the three risk schools described above. Does the risk-language of the NSS 
mostly belong in the ‘political risk analysis’ school, in that it tries to make security policy-making 
grounded in positivistic, ‘scientific’ and rational probability and cost-benefit analyses? Or is it 
transformative in the sense of seeking to build institutions and processes to foster longer-term, 
co-operative, global or local risk management, and thereby to overcome the competitive us-them 
threat language of traditional conceptualisations of security? Or is the language of risk-security in 
the NSS, and the practices it legitimises, best understood from the point of view of the power 
structures it serves and enhances, in that it expands the ability of local or national authorities to 
regulate, control, survey and render ever larger groups of individuals or sets of behaviour as 
‘risky’?     
 
The UK government’s national security discourse 
In this discourse analysis of the UK government’s NSS from 1998 to 2011, we review all MOD 
strategic defence reviews and Cabinet Office national security strategies, starting with the Strategic 
Defence Review (MOD, 1998). We also include documents covering security broadly speaking from 
the MOD’s Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), and one joint document 
from the Department for International Development (DfID), Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO) and MOD.  
 


































































Informed by the work of Freeden (1996) on political concepts, we employ discourse analysis in 
the practical manner of identifying core terms within the NSS texts, tracing when they appear, 
how they evolve over time, how they congregate and relate to each other, and which are core to 
the discourse and which are more peripheral. We pay particular attention to the role the terms of 
‘threat’ and ‘risk’ play within the concept of security, and how these terms are used in 
justifications of particular security prioritisations and policies. The analysis categorises the 
grammar of threat as linked with confrontation, aggression, enemy, urgency, direct and acute 
threats, elimination, and defence. The grammar of risk includes uncertainty, future challenges, 
possibility, potentiality, management, mitigation, resilience, governance, calculation and 
prevention.   
 
The usage of risk-security langauge in the NSS documents from 1998 to 2011 can be divided 
into four clusters. First, it covers potentiality, future challenges, uncertainty and 
unknown/unquantifiable dangers. Second, it is prominent in discussions of remote security 
issues, not posing an immediate danger to the UK or its national interests. Third, it promotes 
societal resilience and ‘preparedness’. Finally, it flourishes in the context of budget cuts and 
austerity measures, where risk assessments are used as a ‘scientific’ method for determining cuts 
and priorities. We discuss each cluster before addressing a topic notable for its lack of prominent 
risk language: The discourse on international terrorism is permeated by the language of threat. 
Since terrorism has been highlighted in the risk-security literature as driven by the logic of risk, 
this finding warrants a separate discussion.  
 
Risk and the unknown 
The NSS documents usually present future potential security challenges, such as climate change, 
pandemic diseases, and migration/demography, as risks.3 In contrast, issues such as terrorism 


































































and organised crime, whose damaging impacts are seen to have already begun to materialise, are 
largely depicted as (clear and present) threats.4  
 
Concern with uncertainty, probabilities and risks, rather than actualities and threats, is 
widespread in the NSS. Most of the documents begin by asserting that we live in an ‘era of 
uncertainty’, as opposed to an earlier period when life was more predictable. For instance, the 
1998 Strategic Defence Review announces that a new era has set in, where ‘there is no longer a 
direct threat to Western Europe or the United Kingdom as we used to know it, and we face no 
significant military threat to any of our Overseas Territories’ (MOD, 1998: chapter 2:21). Yet, 
this does not make us more secure than before. The new era is portrayed as littered with new 
and potentially catastrophic challenges with a high degree of uncertainty, such as environmental 
change and cyber attacks.  
 
The earliest of the documents we analyse often uses ‘risk’ and ‘threat’ interchangeably. It 
frequently refers to new risks as threats and uses traditional security language of danger and attack 
to describe them: ‘There are [...] new risks which threaten our security by attacking our way of 
life.’ (MOD, 1998: chapter 1:9). This muddle could be seen to undermine risk scholars’ assertion 
that the language of risk creates a new security grammar. However, when viewing the NSS 
documents chronologically, it is more accurate to see it as a sign that in 1998 risk-security 
language was just emerging, enthusiastically embraced by, but not yet securely established in the 
NSS discourse.  
 
The message of a fast-changing and uncertain security landscape is recurrent throughout the 
period studied. The 2010 National Security Strategy (Cabinet Office, 2010a) presents the clearest 
distinction between ‘risk’ and ‘threat’. The document is littered with the core risk-security 
terminology such as uncertainty, vulnerability, resilience, flexibility and preparedness. Despite 


































































this, the discourse is anchored in a traditional security rationale. The Foreword presents a 
security message of threats and enemies, asserting that: ‘This Strategy is about gearing Britain up 
for this new age of uncertainty – weighing up the threats we face, and preparing to deal with 
them’. (Cabinet Office, 2010a: 3) 
 
It is noteworthy that the concept of threat dominates the forewords to both the two 2010 
national security strategy documents, while the documents’ main bodies employ a more even 
mix of ‘threat’ and ‘risk’ language (Cabinet Office, 2010a, 2010b). The more urgent and 
dangerous sounding ‘threat’ seems to be chosen when the aim is to grasp attention and establish 
the pressing nature of the document’s message. Risk language is then built on top of this threat 
rationale, for instance by presenting preventive security strategies: ‘we are going to place much 
more emphasis on spotting emerging risks and dealing with them before they become crises’ 
(Cabinet Office, 2010a: 5).  
 
The topic of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) exemplifies the different purposes ‘risk’ 
and ‘threat’ serve in the NSS discourse. ‘Risk’ tends to be employed when discussing WMDs as 
potentialities, and possible scenarios of nuclear confrontation.5 ‘Threat’ is generally used when 
discussing WMDs as direct or proximate threats to the UK;6 traditional military options such as 
armed response and deterrence;7 or WMDs and international terrorist networks.8 This confirms 
risk scholars’ argument that risk language is distinct from that of the Copenhagen School 
terminology. The former is about managing conditions of possibility, while the latter invokes 
immediacy. Both are eminently present in the discussion of WMDs. 
Far-away risks, proximate threats 
Traditional security issues, such as armed conflict, are mostly discussed through a language of 
threat. One exception is when addressing the need to ‘prevent, mediate and mitigate’ distant 


































































conflicts and instability (Cabinet Office, 2008: 13-14, 33-41, 2010b; DFID, FCO and MOD, 
2011; JDCC, 2003: 7-21). While conflict overseas is a traditional politico-military security matter, 
risk language is allowed to dominate discussions of conflict in far-away parts of the world as 
long as preventing or intervening in such conflicts are not presented as vital to the UK’s own 
security. Building stability overseas is argued to be in Britain’s interest, as it may lead to a spread 
of Britain’s democratic values. It is also presented as cost-effective, since prevention is cheaper 
than humanitarian (military) intervention (DFID, FCO and MOD, 2011: 4). As soon as the 
discussion turns to the danger of direct harm to the UK, for instance failed states becoming safe 
havens for international terrorists, the language of threat usually reappears.9  
 
Risk language gives the UK government a greater range of options for how to respond to 
instability and conflict in distant (geographically and/or politically) parts of the world. Threats 
demand a response. Risks can be weighed, and according to the logic of the political risk school, 
calculations of the probability of a conflict happening, and of it affecting UK interests, can be 
made. As an example of such a strategy, the UK Stabilisation Unit has developed a conflict 
assessment tool focussed on prevention, called the Joint Assessment on Conflict and Stability 
(JACS). This tool aims to monitor fragile states that are not top national security priorities, but 
should be kept ‘on the horizon to prevent conflict from arising’.10  
 
Since such calculations inevitably depend on assumptions, selections and omissions based on 
analytical outlook, historical lessons and partial empirical knowledge, there is significant room 
for choice regarding if and how the UK should become involved in particular conflicts overseas. 
Thus, reliance on the language of risk can make security responses less prescriptive and thus less 
predictable. The 2010 NSS documents’ lack of prescriptive authority was criticised by the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (2012: 16). The committee 
commented: ‘We accept that the NSS is not a “recipe book” which dictates our response to 


































































every event, but we would have expected to have seen some evidence that it had influenced 
decisions made since the SDSR [Strategic Defence and Security Review], including the 
Government’s responses to the Arab Spring [for instance to intervene militarily in Libya but not 
in Syria]. We have found no such evidence.’  
Resilience, preparedness and proactive security  
In the case of non-traditional security issues such as climate change or pandemic diseases, the 
NSS documents generally suggest ‘soft’ security responses. Rather than conjuring up images of 
hostility and confrontation, the language of risk is employed to outline strategies ‘to prevent 
emergencies arising in the first place’ (Cabinet Office, 2008: 41) and find ‘collective solutions’ 
and ‘opportunities for international cooperation’ (Cabinet Office, 2008: 18; 2010a: 20). The use 
of risk language often signifies an optimistic view of security, geared towards working together 
to reduce risks and build a more secure future for all. These findings are in line with the global 
risk management school’s assertion of risk-security’s transformative quality, triggering a security 
practice of management and coping, rather than elimination and defence. For example, in the 
area of climate change, the FCO has made active use of security language to endorse greater 
preventive climate action amongst states. This illustrates how softer notions of security can 
coincide with alternative security practices of prevention and diplomacy (Trombetta, 2008). As 
argued by Margaret Beckett, UK Foreign Secretary in 2006-2007:  
 
[W]hile an unstable climate has obvious hard security implications, the traditional 
tools of hard security – in simple terms bombs and bullets – are not going to 
solve that problem. Instead we are going to have to think a lot more 
imaginatively and a lot more broadly about how we can act together to guarantee 
that kind of security. And that will mean much greater understanding of and 
commitment to non-military options: to international diplomacy; to leveraging 


































































international finance and markets; to building coalitions between governments, 
business and consumers (Beckett, 2007).  
 
The FCO involved the military in executing this form of preventive diplomacy when appointing 
Rear Admiral Neil Morisetti as UK Climate and Energy Security Envoy. The position, tasked 
with raising awareness of the urgency of mitigation action to prevent a dangerous scenario of 
climate change (FCO, 2010: 21), was discontinued at the end of 2012. 
 
In an ‘age of uncertainty’ where not all risks can be eliminated, the flip side of precaution is 
resilience - the ability to bounce back when disaster strikes. ‘[W]e cannot prevent every risk as 
they are inherently unpredictable. To ensure we are able to recover quickly when risks turn into 
actual damage to our interests, we have to promote resilience, both locally and nationally’ 
(Cabinet Office, 2010a: 25). Hence, in recent years the NSS discourse has included the theme of 
strengthening the resilience of UK society faced with various disasters from floods and 
pandemics to terror attacks and organised crime.11 These ideas are already being implemented 
through the UK’s National Risk Assessment (NRA) and National Risk Register, exercises that 
are deeply in the mould of the positivistic political risk school. The governmentality school, 
however, views such developments with some reservation, as it redirects responsibility for 
security from the state to the individual (Joseph, 2011). To ensure the UK’s own national 
security, UK citizens are asked to ‘look after themselves and each other for a period until any 
necessary external assistance can be provided’ (Cabinet Office, 2011: 3). 
 
Budget cuts and security choices  
Risk language reached particular prominence in the NSS discourse in the wake of the global 
financial crisis. Risk language is employed to make the realm of security politics calculable and 


































































controllable – or at least seemingly so – through risk assessment exercises, statistical prognosis 
and scenario building. Such exercises are common in recent NSS documents for the specific 
purpose of justifying budget cuts in national security spending.  
 
The two main NSS documents in 2010 utilise a ‘National Security Risk Assessment’ to determine 
and justify tough security policy choices (Cabinet Office, 2010a, 2010b). The risk assessment 
follows the positivist ambitions of the political risk analysis school in attempting to identify risks 
in terms of probability and impact, and use these ‘calculations’ to present a cost-effective 
security strategy built on a hierarchy of Tier One, Tier Two, and Tier Three risks: ‘In particular, 
it helps us to prioritise the risks which represent the most pressing security concerns in order to 
identify the actions and resources needed to deliver our responses to those risks’ (Cabinet 
Office, 2010a: 25-27). The dramatic budget cuts themselves were presented as a security issue:  
 
‘Our ability to meet these current and future threats depends crucially on tackling the budget 
deficit. Our national security depends on our economic security and vice versa […]. So at the 
heart of the Strategic Defence and Security Review are some tough choices to bring the 
defence budget back to balance. Those choices are informed by the risks, analysis and 
prioritisation set out in this National Security Strategy’. (Cabinet Office, 2010a: 4)  
 
Similarly, the recent focus on soft security tools such as prevention, risk management and 
diplomacy flows to some extent from budget concerns: 
  
Given that future conflict will take many forms […] this [conventional military] approach is 
likely to become prohibitively expensive due to the pressure on financial resources combined 
with the increasing scope of conflict. States are therefore likely to seek alternative strategies to 
manage risk including increased interdependence and burden-sharing with traditional allies […]. 
(DCDC, 2010b: 71, emphasis in original) 



































































The DCDC stresses (although with some contradictions and caveats) that preventive strategies 
are ‘better and cheaper than cure’ (DCDC, 2010a: 36) and that ‘£1 spent on conflict prevention 
generates over £4 in savings for the international community’ (DCDC, 2010a: 27; see also 
Cabinet Office, 2010b: 3; DFID, FCO and MOD, 2011: 4).  
 
Risk language suits the austerity message of the recent NSS discourse well. Adopting a financial 
language of quantification and prioritisation, the National Security Risk Assessment aims to 
justify hard choices with scientific reasoning to reassure citizens that the government remains 
capable of responding to both financial and security challenges.  
Terror threats 
Soon after 11 September 2001, Rasmuss n (2001: 308) argued that the terror attacks on the US 
were ‘a tragic example of a new asymmetrical strategic reality that is better understood by the 
concept of risk society than by traditional notions of terrorism’. Several risk scholars have 
highlighted counter-terror as guided by risk-security logic (Aradau and Van Munster, 2007; de 
Goede, 2008; Mythen and Walklate, 2008; Rasmussen, 2004; Van Munster, 2005). A more 
nuanced picture emerges from an analysis of the terrorism discourse in the NSS. 
 
Before 2001, the NSS discourse presented international terrorism as one among several potential 
risks: ‘over the next twenty years, the risks to international stability seem as likely to come from 
other factors [than state aggression]: ethnic and religious conflict, population and environmental 
pressures; competition for scarce resources; drugs, terrorism and crime’ (MOD, 1998: chapter 
2:29). In contrast, from 2002, the NSS discourse largely portrays terrorism in traditional security 
language of deterrence, threat and enemies. Resolved to ‘look again at the United Kingdom’s 
defence posture and plans to ensure that we have the right concepts, the right capabilities and 


































































the right forces to meet additional challenges we now face’, the 2002 NSS document (MOD, 
2002a: 6) functioned as a securitising act, using traditional security language to justify additional 
spending and draconian measures to counter the terror threat. The document uses aggressive 
language such as ‘eliminate terrorism’, ‘enemies’, ‘aggressors’, ‘deter’ and ‘defeat international 
terrorism’, and argues that ‘[w]e must [...] continue to be ready and willing to deploy significant 
forces overseas, and, when legally justified, to act against terrorists and those who harbour them’ 
(MOD, 2002a: 9). 
 
While prevention can be part of the risk vocabulary, it can also justify pre-emptive strikes: ‘the 
main sorts of military effect we can bring to bear are to prevent, deter, coerce, disrupt or destroy 
our opponents’, whether international terrorist organisations or the states that sponsor them 
(MOD, 2002a: 9). In a similarly confrontational vein, the MOD argues that ‘[w]e must influence 
leaderships [of ‘states of concern and terrorist organisations’] by showing that we are prepared to 
take all necessary means to defend ourselves’ (MOD, 2002a: 12).  
 
In 2008, international terrorism (described as a ‘new’ risk in 1998) is referred to as one of the 
‘more traditional security threats’ (Cabinet Office, 2008: 4). The document stresses that ‘[t]he 
threat of terrorism is real and […] more serious than those we have faced in the past’, although it 
places less emphasis on military capabilities, and more on intelligence, police work and 
cooperation with other governmental and private sector actors, than the 2002 document 
(Cabinet Office, 2008: 25-28). Chapter three, entitled ‘Security challenges’, leads with a section 
on terrorism which is void of risk-security terminology, while a later section on infectious 
diseases and extreme weather events is dominated by risk language (Cabinet Office, 2008: 10-11, 
14-15). There seems to have been a deliberate choice to describe terrorism in traditional security 
language, setting it apart as the most urgent security challenge facing Britain.  
 


































































To some extent risk language has reappeared in the terrorism discourse in the 2010 NSS, which 
discusses terrorism under the headings ‘highest priority risks’ (Cabinet Office, 2010a: 28) and 
‘Tier One risks’ (Cabinet Office, 2010b: 41). Nonetheless, the actual discussion of terrorism 
beneath such headings is steeped in threat-security formulations such as ‘[t]he current threat to 
the UK from international terrorism is judged to be Severe, meaning that an attack in this 
country is highly likely’ (Cabinet Office, 2010b: 41). The headings are determined by the 
National Security Risk Assessment, which provides an overall framework for the 2010 NSS. 
Within this framework terrorism is a Tier One risk, but the main purpose of the framework itself 
is, as discussed, to justify austerity measures (Cabinet Office, 2010a: 13-14, 16, 28-20, 2010b: 41-
44). 
  
Aradau and Van Munster (2007: 107-8) argue ‘that the “war on terror” should be understood 
through the prism of precautionary risk rather than the traditional theoretical lenses of IR’. Our 
analysis of the NSS suggests a need to modify this. Certainly a host of anti-terror security 
practices in the UK follow the precautionary principle – including heightened surveillance, risk 
screening, participation in rendition processes of ‘high-risk’ individuals, and detention without 
trial. But such practices are predominantly legitimised through a discourse of direct and urgent 
threat, not risk.  
Conclusion: risks and threats 
Some risk scholars argue that a transition to the concept of risk has led to a fundamental 
redefinition of security away from its traditional meaning in International Relations as the 
protection of highly valued goods against threats to their destruction. Our analysis shows the 
‘rise of risk’ in the NSS to be less a matter of fundamental transition and more an embellishment 
and expansion of the concept of security. The traditional threat-security conceptualisation 
remains dominant when the UK government aims to convince its audience of the need to 


































































prioritise a particular security issue, such as terrorism. In this sense, the Copenhagen School’s 
understanding of ‘securitising acts’, and how and why they are performed, corresponds with the 
use of threat language in the NSS.  
 
But this is only part of the story. Risk language has obtained a significant role, particularly within 
the 2010 NSS. Risk and its adjoining terms serve two important purposes in the NSS. First, it 
facilitates expansion of security policy into new areas such as climate change, and when 
addressing distant conflicts and instability. Second, and somewhat opposite, it provides a 
‘scientific’ justification for defence cuts and hard choices in a time of austerity.  
 
The NSS authors often seem at home in the ‘political risk’ school. In the years after the global 
economic crisis in 2008, present and certain economic woes pulled rank on future security 
uncertainties in the calculations of security officials, leading to a particularly actuarial 
conceptualisation of risk as cost-benefit analysis to justify expenditures and budget cuts. The 
authors of recent NSS documents suggest that a positivistic methodology of weighing the 
probability of an emergency against its severity is possible. The 2012 National Risk Assessment 
(Cabinet Office, 2012: 2-3) describes its methodology as ‘consulting experts in government 
departments and beyond’. These experts use historical and numerical analysis to assess the 
probability of an emergency, before employing the criteria of ‘fatality’, ‘illness or injury’, 
‘psychological impact’, ‘social disruption’ and ‘economic harm’ (each scored from zero to five) to 
establish the severity of the emergency. Scenarios are then plotted along the axes of plausibility 
and impact, yielding a hierarchy of risk-priorities (Cabinet Office, 2012: 8). 
 
Petersen (2013: 705-6) convincingly argues that the shakiness of such methodologies, and the 
ontological claims on which they rest, are clear even to proponents of ‘political risk’ schools. 
There are good reasons to argue that the NSS authors, aware of these methodological problems, 


































































sometimes use risk-security language as a rhetorical tool with which to superimpose order and 
objectivity on an unwieldy and contested security environment. The writing of the NSS is a 
highly political process, pitting different interests and perceptions against each other. A key goal 
for the 2010 NSS was to justify austerity cuts in defence spending. A ‘national security risk 
assessment’ provided seemingly uncontentious scientific justifications for such cuts.  
  
It is not easy to determine how risk-security language in the NSS discourse translates into risk-
security practices, particularly in the area of political risks rather than natural hazards. The 
Parliamentary Joint Committee criticized the 2010 NSS for a lack of strategic policy guidance. 
Our analysis suggests several reasons for the discrepancy between discourse and practice. First, 
as described above, the rhetorical usefulness of ‘political risk’ analysis. Second, the fact that risk 
assessment exercises, especially when dealing with political risks, leave too much room for 
interpretation when particular crises emerge. Finally, contextual factors play a role. After a 
relative lull in armed conflict and upheaval around the world in the late 2000s, the period after 
the publication of the 2010 NSS has been highly eventful. Violent conflict has spread across 
Africa’s Sahel belt. The Arab Spring has led to widespread turmoil, including NATO 
intervention in Libya and large-scale civil war in Syria. A resurgent Russia has intervened 
militarily in parts of Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014) and is challenging NATO for influence 
and dominance in its near region. These developments are conducive to security practices 
focused on present and palpable political and military threats to the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of European states and their allies. This could lead to the next NSS revision, scheduled 
for 2015, returning to a stronger emphasis on military defence capabilities and NATO 
credibility, justified in the traditional language of threat-security.    
 
From a normative point of view, can the rise of risk in the NSS discourse be viewed as 
progressive? As we have shown, the ‘political risk analysis’ approach of the 2010 NSS is only 


































































seemingly objective. Considering the many risks on the horizon and the many ways in which 
their probability and impact can be gauged, there is room for political preferences and value 
judgments in the determination of risk hierarchies and choices of responses. Unlike the political 
risk school, the global risk management and governmentality schools both make normative 
judgments. And despite being contradictory, both their perspectives are applicable to the NSS. 
 
In line with the global risk management school, risk language has justified the expansion of 
security policy options, away from deterrence and war to diplomatic, cooperative and 
precautionary action, not just in new issue areas such as climate change, but also in the focus on 
preventative approaches to overseas instability. But the governmentality school points out that 
these same trends can have negative normative implications. Risk assessments and risk registers 
justify the spread of routine practices of monitoring, intervention and control. An argument can 
be made that JACS, the newly developed conflict assessment tool, is an example of such a 
controlling practice, in which fragile states become subject to enhanced monitoring by an 
interventionist power in the name of preventive security.  
 
In this article, we have investigated the conceptual, practical and normative implications of the 
rise of risk in the NSS discourse. Regarding the conceptualisation of security, our analysis of the 
NSS provides evidence that the rise of risk has expanded, not radically transformed, the concept 
of security. Moving to security practice, risk-security language performs so many functions in the 
NSS that there is no simple answer to the question of what this conceptual expansion means for 
UK security policy. It has accompanied, and facilitated, the inclusion of environmental hazards 
on the security agenda, and underpins the ‘resilience’ and ‘preparedness’ responses to extreme 
weather events. For political dangers, risk analysis may give policy makers better tools for 
scanning the security horizon, but may be less useful for prescribing action in particular crisis. 
Finally, the normative implications are mixed: The NSS’s risk-security language provides more 


































































room for non-violent, longer-term and cooperative security measures. But even preventive and 
non-confrontational security practices could increase levels of control and fear over a wider set 
of societal issues.  
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Endnotes 
                                                
1
 David Cameron and Nick Clegg’s introduction to the 2010 National Security Strategy (Cabinet Office, 2010a: 
5)   
2
 Petersen calls this ‘critical risk studies’, and combines Foucauldian analysts and Critical Theory scholars in 
the Frankfurt school tradition. There are crucial distinctions between Critical Theory and the governmentality 
tradition. Since Critical Theory has produced few risk-security studies, we focus here only on the 
governmentality approach.    


































































                                                                                                                                                  
3
 E.g. Cabinet Office (2008: 11-12, 14-15, 18-19, 22, 29, 31, 2009: 6, 13, 40, 51-53, 88-90, 2010a: 17, 30-31, 2010b: 
50, 55; DCDC (2007: 6-7, 9-11, 17, 26, 28, 34-37, 40, 2010b: 30, 61, 69, 95-99, 114-115). One exception, discussing 
these issues as both threat and risk is JDCC (2003). 
4 E.g. Cabinet Office (2008: 10-13, 2009: 11, 22-24, 75-80, 2010a: 13-14, 28-29, 2010b: 41-44, 52); DFID, FCO and 
MOD (2011: 10 and 27); JDCC (2003: 1.10, 1.18-1.19, 5.16, 6.3, 7.25, 7.27, 8.3, 8.10-8.11, 8.17); MOD (2002a, 
2002b, 2003). DCDC (2007 and 2010) use a mixed language of threat and risk to discuss terrorism. 
5
 Cabinet Office (2008: 12, 29, 31, 2010b: 55); DCDC (2007: 50, 2010a: 10, 2010b: 12). An exception is DCDC 
(2010b: 62). 
6
 Cabinet Office (2008: 12, 29, 2010b: 55); DCDC (2010a: 8); JDCC (2003: 1.14, 8.9, 8.13); MOD (2003: 4-5, 2008, 
point 236). 
7
 Cabinet Office (2009: 29, 31); DCDC (2010a: 28); JDCC (2003: 8-8); MOD (1998: chapter 3:55, 2003: 13). 
8 Cabinet Office (2008: 12); JDCC (2003: 8-10). 
9
 Cabinet Office (2008: 38, 2010b: 44); DFID, FCO and MOD (2011: 8); JDCC (2003: 1-10, 7-27, 8-10). An 
exception is DCDC (2007: 16). 
10
 Telephone interview, Head Lessons Team, UK’s Government’s Stabilisation Unit, a tri-departmental unit of 
the FCO, DFID and MOD, 19 July 2012. 
11 E.g. Cabinet Office (2008: 41-43, 2010a: 10, 22, 25, 2010b: 9, 12; 29-50). DFID, FCO and MOD (2011) uses the 
concept of resilience to argue for strengthening fragile states to prevent conflict overseas. 
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